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Abstract
In 2002, Moldovyan and Moldovyan introduced a
cipher with security based mainly on data-dependent per-
mutations (DDPs) called CIKS–1. The goal of the cipher
was to exploit the speed and simplicity of DDPs to create
a fast hardware-oriented block cipher. In the original
paper, the authors claimed that the cipher is immune
to differential cryptanalysis. This paper investigates the
propagation of differentials through the cipher. An attack
is then presented to reveal the last subkey of the cipher
with a data complexity better than previously claimed.
Keywords: Cryptography; computer security; cryptanaly-
sis; encryption; block cipher.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Ron Rivest introduced a new block cipher
called RC5 [1]. This cipher was quite simple, depending
only on a key schedule and a set of Data Dependant
Rotations (DDRs) for its security. RC5 was not the ﬁrst
cipher to use data–dependent rotations, but it did attract
interest due to its ability to thwart linear and differen-
tial cryptanalysis attacks [2]. Since then, data–dependent
rotations and data–dependent permutations (DDPs) have
become increasingly popular in ciphers. Two of the ﬁnal
candidate ciphers in the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), MARS and RC6, used DDRs along with other
primitives to produce ciphers resistant to both linear and
differential cryptanalysis.
In [3] a new cipher making heavy use of DDPs was
introduced. CIKS–1, an 8–round block cipher, was de-
signed for speed in hardware and uses the DDPs to provide
nonlinearity while mixing key and data bits. Preliminary
analysis of the cipher showed it to be resistant to both
linear and differential cryptanalysis.
Two previous attacks on this cipher have been pre-
sented. In [4], a chosen plaintext attack was shown to work
on a 5–round version of CIKS–1. The authors used selected
inputs to effectively bypass the ﬁrst round and tracked the
parity of the data through the cipher to reveal the subkey
of the last round. This attack has a complexity of 265.7,
but is limited in the number of rounds to which it can be
applied.
In [5] we presented an attack which exploited the slow
rate of hamming weight growth of the data in CIKS-1. The
χ2 test is used to compare the weight of the cipher’s output
to a binomial distribution when encrypted by a guessed
key. It was shown that the weight of the ﬁrst round subkey
can be derived with a time complexity of 252 for a 6–round
version of the cipher.
In this paper a differential attack on CIKS–1 is pre-
sented. A brief analysis of the CIKS–1 data–dependent
permutations are given, discussing the probabilities of a
difference passing through them unchanged. An attack that
reveals the last subkey of the cipher is then presented.
2. THE CIKS–1 CIPHER
The CIKS–1 cipher is a fast, hardware–oriented ci-
pher, with its principle security component being data–
dependent permutations. It is a block cipher with block size
64–bits. The cipher is composed of 8 rounds, each with
a 32–bit subkey for a total key size of 256–bits. A single
round of the cipher is shown in Figure 1. The solid lines
in the diagram show the ﬂow of data and the dashed lines
are control vectors. Permutations are labeled Pn/m, where
n is the number of bits permuted and m is the number of
bits of control.
The 64–bit data is split into half for input to the left and
right sides. Each side is then used as a control vector (CV)
for permutations of the data on the opposite side. The left
hand side data also plays the role of CV for the permutation
of the key. There are two ﬁxed permutations (Π1 and Π2)
used to further shufﬂe the CVs for permutations P2 and
P6. The key is added to the right side data by the XOR.
At the end of a round the right side data is added to the
left side using 16 parallel 2–bit additions and, with the
exception of the last round, the two sides are swapped.
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 2004 IEEEFig. 1. A single round of the CIKS–1 cipher [3]
3. THE CIKS–1 DATA–DEPENDENT
PERMUTATIONS
The label data–dependent permutations refers to a large
set of functions. Basically, a data–dependent permutation
includes any permutation of data which is directly inﬂu-
enced by another piece of the data. In RC5, the DDP is a
simple rotation of one half of the data n bits left, where n
is determined by a subset of the bits in the other half of
the data. This is known as a data–dependent rotation, one
of the simplest DDPs.
The data–dependent permutations in CIKS–1 use a
control vector to determine the permutation of the position
of the input bits in the output. For example, the 2–bit
P2/1 DDP requires a CV of only one bit. If the CV is
a 0, the bits are swapped, otherwise they pass through
the primitive without changing position. These smaller
permutation blocks are layered together to form more
complex permutations.
Figure 2 shows the “butterﬂy” pattern that is used to
connect the various levels of these permutations. This
ensures that bits that are grouped together in the input
are not continually swapped with each other as they move
through the levels. It also guarantees that a CV which is
P2/1 P2/1
P2/1 P2/1
X0 X1 X2 X3
Y0 Y1 Y2 Y3
CV0 CV1
CV3 CV2
Fig. 2. A P4/4 Data–Dependant Permutation
comprised of mostly 1s will not result in a poorly permuted
output. Further information on the structure of the data–
dependent permutations found in CIKS–1 can be found in
[3].
4. DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS
Introduced by Biham and Shamir in [6], differential
cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack. The attack
classically uses sets of pairs of inputs have a common
difference X0 = X0
L
X1, where X0 and X1 represent
two different input values. These pairs, when used as input
to the cipher, lead to a detectable output difference Y 0 =
Y0
L
Y1, where Y0 and Y1 represent outputs corresponding
to to the inputs X0 and X1 respectively. The pair, (X0, Y 0)
is referred to as a differential. Highly likely differentials
can be exploited to determine key bit information.
Once a highly probable differential is found for x rounds
of an x + 1 round cipher, the last round subkey can be
attacked. Many pairs with the speciﬁed input difference
are encrypted, over x + 1 rounds. Each pair is then
partially decrypted through the last round using all possible
candidate subkeys and a check for the output difference of
round x is performed. The actual subkey will result in the
largest count of the round x output differences to match
the difference predicted by the differentials.
Being the main element of CIKS–1, it might be ex-
pected that the DDPs would play a major role in the
propagation of differences through the cipher. In fact,
other than the parallel addition, DDPs are involved in all
operations of the cipher data. On both sides of the cipher,
data is scrambled by the permutations and the key itself
is scrambled before being added. In our analysis we focus
on the hamming weight of differences, rather than actual
differences.
Obviously, if the control vector on a DDP is the same
in two different instances, then the data will be permuted
the same way. When the control vector does change,the likelihood of an added bit difference depends on the
difference at the input. When there is only a difference in
the control vector, the input to the P2/1 permutation that
the particular CV bit affects determines if there is a bit
difference created. The swap at this site is only noticeable
if the input bits are different. Thus, there is a 50% chance
that the data will be unchanged by the control vector
difference. In this case the probability that the cipher data
will remain unchanged by the DDP is 2−n, where n is the
number of different bits in the control vector.
The case where there is a difference in weight of the
input, as well as the CV, is more complex. When the CV
difference bit is the control for a P2/1 permutation where
there is also a difference in one of the input bits, there
is no new bit difference introduced in the data. In fact,
if both input bits are changed, the output will have no
new difference. These cases actually increase the chance
of a given difference surviving a DDP. In our analysis,
a one–bit difference input into a P32/80 with a control
vector containing two differences has approximately a 28%
probability of retaining a one–bit difference at the output.
5. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENTIALS
In the paper [3] the CIKS–1 authors make the claim
that the number of plaintext pairs required for a differential
attack on the cipher is in the order of 264. This analysis is
done by ignoring the internal key schedule and permutation
P1 and focusing on P2 and P6 (the P32/80 permutations on
the right hand side of the cipher). Although their analysis is
simpliﬁed, the authors contend that the assumptions made
are to the advantage of the attacker, and even so, the cipher
appears to be secure against differential cryptanalysis.
If an analysis of the cipher is done not on strict
differentials, but the hamming weight of differentials as
they pass through the cipher, it is possible to construct an
attack which has much lower complexity than the one in
[3]. Three input differences weights were examined for re-
lations to four output difference weights of interest. Those
are given in Table I for one round where (wt(∆Li−1),
wt(∆Ri−1)) and (wt(∆Li), wt(∆Ri)) are the left and
right halves of the hamming weights of the differences in
the input and output respectively.
Taking the case of (wt(∆Li−1) = 1, wt(∆Ri−1) = 1),
we see that the right side difference can appear either once
or twice in control vector V. Taking into account both
cases, the probability of the one–bit difference surviving
P1 is 12.5%. Again, depending on where the one–bit
difference in the left side occurs, it can appear in V 0 either
two or three times. Thus, the probability of the one–bit
difference on the right side surviving P2 is approximately
8.1%. When the key is XORed with the right side data,
there are many possible cases to examine. Any case where
subtraction of the right side and key differences has a
Differentials Probability
(wt(∆Li−1)=0,wt(∆Ri−1)=1) 2−3.4
→(wt(∆Li)=1,wt(∆Ri)=2)
(wt(∆Li−1)=0,wt(∆Ri−1)=1) 2−1.83
→(wt(∆Li)=1,wt(∆Ri)=1)
(wt(∆Li−1)=1,wt(∆Ri−1)=0) 2−7.25
→(wt(∆Li)=0,wt(∆Ri)=1)
(wt(∆Li−1)=1,wt(∆Ri−1)=1) 2−13.7
→(wt(∆Li)=1,wt(∆Ri)=0)
(wt(∆Li−1)=1,wt(∆Ri−1)=1) 2−13.7
→(wt(∆Li)=1,wt(∆Ri)=1)
(wt(∆Li−1)=1,wt(∆Ri−1)=1) 2−7.75
→(wt(∆Li)=1,wt(∆Ri)=2)
TABLE I
Frequency of occurrence of transitions of interest with
random keys.
weight of one could result in the right side having a
difference of one–bit. The most dominant of these cases
are (wt(∆Ri−1) = 1, wt(∆K) = 0) and (wt(∆Ri−1) =
1,wt(∆K)= 2). To simplify the analysis, we consider only
these cases and get a likelihood of the one–bit difference
surviving of approximately 2−5.7. P6 acts similarly to P2.
Overall, the probability of a (wt(∆Li−1) = 1, wt(∆Ri−1)
= 1) difference leading to a (wt(∆Li) = 1, wt(∆Ri) = 0)
is 2−13.7.
The other differential probabilities can be calculated in
a similar way. Note that in the cases where the difference
only appears on one side of the cipher, many of the cipher’s
elements do not affect the difference on the other side.
These one round differentials can be chained together
to get an overall differential for the cipher. To represent
this the notation (Li−1, Ri−1) → (Li, Ri) is used to
represent the difference of each side of the input and output
pair. If we use the 7 round chain of differentials (0,1) →
(1,1) → (1,0) → (0,1) → (1,1) → (1,0) → (0,1) → (1,1)
with probability 2−47.39. Figure 3 shows the probability of
transitions between all of the differentials of interest.
6. PROPOSED ATTACK
As shown in the last section there are certain differ-
entials with a high probability of occurrence. The differ-
entials (0, 1) → (1, 1), (1, 0) → (0, 1), (1, 1) → (1, 2)
and (1, 0) → (1, 2) are the most attractive. When chaining
together multiple rounds these differentials are reused as
frequently as possible to keep the overall probability high.
Though the (1, 0) → (1, 2) and (1, 1) → (1, 2) differentials
have a high probability, they are not as useful since they
can only be used at the end of a chain.
To attack the cipher, we ﬁrst chose a differential with a
relatively high probability of success to use. For example,
to attack a 6 round version of the cipher the chain (1, 0)
→ (0, 1) → (1, 1) → (1, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 1) could
be used with a probability of approximately 2−31.86. In(0, 1) (1, 1)
(1, 2)
(1, 0)
2-1.83
2-13.7 2-7.25
2-3.4
2-7.75
2-13.7
Fig. 3. Probabilities of Transitions of interest
Score Frequency
0 9760
1 238
2 2
TABLE II
Frequency of occurrence of desired differential with
random keys.
this case, the output difference would be expected once
in every 4 billion encryptions. Hence, several times more
than 4 billion encryptions would be required to clearly
distinguish the occurrence of the expected difference. To
attack the cipher, for every plaintext pair encrypted, the last
round is decrypted using all possible subkeys, keeping a
count of the number of times the (1,1) difference appears.
The key with the highest count at the end of the process
is the most likely to be the actual subkey.
To date, an attack has been implemented on a 3–round
reduced version of the cipher using 10000 plaintext pairs.
The chain used for the attack was (1, 0) → (0, 1) →
(1, 1), with a probability of occurrence of approximately
2−9.08. The test was run using the actual key, 32 keys
different in one bit from the actual key, and 10000 random
keys. The actual key returned the expected difference 22
times. The keys with a one–bit difference from the actual
key all returned a count of 0, making them quite easily
distinguishable from the actual key. The set of random
keys produced counts of 0 to 2. The distribution of counts
for the random keys is given in Table II. The conclusion
is that the correct key is easily distinguishable.
Although only a 3–round version of this attack has been
implemented, it could easily be extended to the 6–round
version with data complexity of approximately 235. In fact,
it is theoretically possible to extend this attack to the full
cipher. For this extension, the differential chain (0, 1) → (1,
1) → (1, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 1) → (1, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 1)
could be used, with the data complexity of approximately
256 to recover the ﬁnal round subkey and a time complexity
of 232 × 256 = 288. The remaining subkeys can then be
found by stripping off the last round and implementing the
attack again on the remaining rounds.
7. CONCLUSION
In the original paper for the CIKS–1 cipher, the authors’
analysis of the possibility of differential attack on the
cipher showed that it would have a data complexity of
264. In this paper a differential attack has been proposed
with data complexity of approximately 256. To prove the
concept of this attack, the attack has been implemented
on a 3–round version of the cipher. This attack showed
that the actual key could be determined easily from both
random keys and keys one–bit different than the actual.
Although preliminary testing of this attack on the 3–
round reduced version of the CIKS–1 cipher is quite
promising, future work is planned to extend the attack. The
6–round attack given in the paper with data complexity of
approximately 235 will be implemented and tested.
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